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I. INTRODUCTION

Cheryl L. Vandevender was working for a Sheetz convenience store when
she suffered a back injury while opening a large pickle jar.' After undergoing back
surgery, Ms. Vandevender was prevented from working by Sheetz, unless she was
" 100%. " 2 Due to the fact that Sheetz' company policy did not allow her to return to
work, 3she was subsequently fired in accordance with Sheetz' one-year absence
policy.
As a result, Ms. Vandevender filed a civil action against Sheetz for refusing to rehire her in violation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the West Vir-

2

See Vandevender v. Sheetz Inc., 490 S.E.2d 678, 682 n.1 (W. Va. 1997) (per curiam).
Id. at 632.

3

See id. at 683.

I
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ginia Workers' Compensation Act4 and the West Virginia Human Rights Act5 , and
for unlawful reprisal in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. 6 Following a three-day jury trial, Ms. Vandevender was awarded $2,699,000 in punitive
damages.7 Sheetz filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the
alternative, a new trial or remittitur. 8 The circuit court denied these motions and
Sheetz appealed.9
In Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.'0 ("Vandevender"), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered whether the $2,699,000 punitive award against
Sheetz for unlawful termination/failure to rehire and retaliation was unconstitutionally excessive.11 The Vandevender Court upheld the punitive damages awarded for
the retaliation claim, but found that the punitive damages awarded for the unlawful12
termination and failure to rehire claims were excessive under its prior holdings.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the damages awarded
for the unlawful termination and failure to rehire claims could not be upheld under
its ruling
in Syllabus Point fifteen of TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
3
Corp.1

The Vandevender Court reasoned that because the record lacked evidence
that the unlawful termination/failure to rehire claims were prompted by malice or
intent to cause specific harm and because the evidence on these claims failed to
demonstrate fraud, trickery, or deceit on Sheetz' part, it could not uphold the punitive to compensatory ratio of seven-to-one.14 The Court then reduced this portion of
the award by the amount of $466,260 so that the punitive to compensatory ratio
would be roughly five-to-one.' 5 The Court did not reduce the amount of punitive

4

W. VA. CODE §§ 23-5A-1 to -3 (1998).

5

W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (1994 & Supp. 1998).

6

W.VA. CODE § 5-11-9(7)(C) (Supp. 1998).

7

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 684.

8

See id. Remittitur is defined as "[tihe procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the jury

is reduced." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (6" ed. 1990).
9

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 684.

10

Id. at 678.

11

Id. at 682.

12

See id..

13

TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1992), affd, 509
U.S. 443, (1993) (plurality opinion).
The outer limit of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in cases in which the
defendant has acted with extreme negligence or wanton disregard but with no actual intention to cause harm
and in which compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large is roughly 5 to 1. However, when
the defendant has acted with actual evil intention, much higher ratios are not per se unconstitutional. See id.
at 874 Syl. Pt. 15.
14

Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 693.

Is

See id
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damages awarded for the retaliation claim, despite a fifteen-to-one ratio, because
the evidence showed willful, mean-spirited acts demonstrating an intent to cause
physical or emotional harm to Ms. Vandevender. 16 The Vandevender Court examined the trial court's review of the award and found that they properly engaged in
upthe required review and that the facts supporting the retaliation claim warrant
17
principles.
process
due
offending
without
ratio
fifteen-to-one
the
holding
This Comment examines the Vandevender decision. Part II addresses the
historical development and reasoning for punitive awards in America. Part III provides a summary of the recent constitutional challenges to punitive damages, focusing on the challenges brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Comment tracks the development of a framework for examining
punitive awards which attempts to ensure due process. This framework lays the
foundation for West Virginia's punitive damages jurisprudence utilized in Vandevender.
Part IV provides a summary of the Vandevender case, and undertakes an
analysis of the majority per curiam opinion and the dissenting opinion. Finally, Part
V explores the Vandevender decision's limitations and impact on future litigation
involving punitive damages in West Virginia.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In ancient times, punitive damages 8 existed in the form of multiple damages, which were awarded as a punitive remedy under The Code of Hammurabi,
the Hindu Code of Manu, the Bible, and other legal systems throughout the world. 9
However, punitive damages as a modem legal doctrine is attributed to the devel-

16

See id.

17

See id. at 693-94.
is
"Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
19

See John Zenneth Lagrow, Comment, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: Due Process Protec-

lion Against Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 157, 160 (1997) [hereinafter
Lagrow] (citing LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.0 at 1 (3' ed. 1995)

[hereinafter SCHLUETER & REDDEN]). Ancient codes such as the Hittite Law and the Hindu Code of Manu"
provided for multiple damages. See id. at 160 n.16 (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN supra § 1.1 n.2). One of
the earliest known codified legal systems, the Code of Hammurabi, dating back to 2000 B.C., provided multiple damages exceeding the compensation for actual harm suffered. See id. at 160 n.16 (citing SCHLUETER &
REDDEN supra § 1.1 at 1-2). The Bible states that a man who steals and kills or sells an ox or a sheep shall
restore five ox for an ox and four sheep for a sheep. See id. at 160 n. 16 (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN supra
§ 1.1 n.7 (quoting Exodus 22:1)). Under the Code of Hammurabi, a common carrier who failed to deliver the
goods paid five times the cost of the goods as multiple damages, and a man who stole an ox from the temple
or palace paid thirty fold. See Mimi Bass Miller, Note, Torts-Punitive Damages: A New Finish on Punitive
Damages. BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 519,
523 n.38 (1997) [hereinafter Miller] (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN supra § 1.1 n.1). Under the Babylonian
Code, a delivery person paid five times the cost of the goods if he was guilty of conversion. See id. at 523
n.39 (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN supra§ 1.1 n.2).
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opments that occurred in thirteenth century England.20
In 1278, England became one of the earliest countries to adopt the doctrine
of punitive damages into its legal system by utilizing a statute which provided for
multiple damages. 2' Furthermore, England developed a system in which monetary
penalties known as "amercements" were assessed against wrongdoers to punish
both civil and criminal wrongdoing and were payable to the king or his representative.22
Although the English common law had used punitive damages since the
thirteenth century,23 the modern doctrine of punitive damages was first introduced
in 1763 in the companion cases of Wilkes v. Woods24 ("Wilkes") and Huckle v.
Money25 ("Huckle"). These two cases resulted from the English government's suppression of the "North Briton," a newspaper critical of King George 1I's Secretary,
Lord Halifax.26 In the Wilkes case, John Wilkes brought suit for trespass against a
member of Parliament for having his property searched and seized with only a general warrant and requested exemplary damages arguing that actual damages would
not fully deter future misconduct. 27 Wilkes was awarded £1000 in punitive damages. 28 In Huckle, the court awarded punitive damages29 when the publisher's employee brought suit alleging false imprisonment, trespass, and assault after the King
had ordered all publishers and printers seized. 30 The term "exemplary damages"
was introduced in the Huckle case by Lord Camden when he stated, "I think they
have done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a man's house by virtue of
a nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition.",3' The modem doctrine of punitive damages was born through these two deci20

See Miller, supra note 19, at 523 (citing RICHARD L. BLATT, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-

STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 23 (1991)) [hereinafter BLATT].
21
See Nathan C. Prater, Comment, Punitive Damages in Alabama: A Proposalfor Reform, 26
CUMB. L. REv. 1005, 1008 (1995-96) [hereinafter Prater].
22

Id.

See Miller, supra note 19, at 523 (citing BLATT, supra note 19, at 23). In the thirteenth century,
the English govemment enforced amercements. Currently, the United States idea of punitive damages is
based on the amercement system. See id. at 523 n.40 (citing BLATT, supranote 20, at 23).
24
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.1763).
23

25

95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).

26

Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493-94; Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.

27

Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489-90.

28

See id. at 499. The Court stated that punitive "[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to

the injured person, but likewise as punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future
and as a proof of the detestation ofthejuy to the action itself." Id. at 498-99.
29
Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768. Huckle's detainment lasted only six hours and although his actual
damages were approximately £20, he was awarded £300. See id.
30

Id.

31

Id. at 769. In upholding the award of exemplary damages, the court noted that "the law has not
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sions, and the doctrine was further broadened to meet societal needs not addressed
by the common law.32
Soon after the doctrine of punitive damages became widespread in England, the United States borrowed the doctrine from English Common Law and integrated it into America's legal system. 3 The first American cases to articulate the
doctrine of punitive damages were Genay v. Norris?"("Genay"), in 1784, and
Coryell v. Colbougha5 ("Coryell"), in 1791. At this period in time, punitive damages served both to punish the defendant, and compensate the plaintiff.36 Punitive
damages' role as a deterrent was not well established until the early eighteenth
century when their compensatory function began to decrease.37 By the
mid-nineteenth century, punitive damages were awarded for the purposes of punishment and deterrence.as
In 1851, the United States Supreme Court recognized, in dicta, that punitive damages are "an integral part of the American justice system. 39 The Court
laid down what shall be the measure of damages in actions of tort; the measure is vague and uncertain, depending on a vast variety of causes, facts, and circumstances," and chose not to "intermeddle" in the determination of damages. Id. at 769. "[l]t must be a glaring case indeed of outrageous damages in a tort, and which
all mankind at first blush must think so, to induce a Court to grant a new trial for excessive damages."
Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-769. A comparable approach was taken in the following English cases. See,
e.g., Grey v. Grant, 95 Eng. Rep. 794, 795 (K. B. 1764); Benson v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K. B.
1766).
32
See Miller, supra note 19, at 524 (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at § 1.3(A)).
Many different theories explaining the expansion of the doctrine existed, including justification for excessive
awards, deterrence, compensation for mental anguish, and revenge. See Miller, supra note 19, at 524 n. 49
(citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 19, at § 13(B)). See also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth
and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1990) (discussing the historical development of
punitive damages).
33

See Michael J. King, Casenote, Punitive Damages & Due Process: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Companyv. Haslip, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 323, 335 (1991) [hereinafter King].

34

I S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6 (1784). In Genay, the plaintiff and defendant decided to settle their argument
by a duel with pistols. Id Prior to the duel, the defendant put something in the plaintiffs drink which caused
the plaintiffgreat pain and the court held that the plaintiffwas entitled to exemplary damages. See id. at 7.
35

1 N.J.L. 90 (1791). In Coryell, the defendant broke his promise to marry tile plaintiff whom he
had impregnated and, as a result, the jury was instructed that they should not determine the damages "by any
particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example's sake, to prevent such offences
[sic] in [the] future; and also to allow liberal damages for the breach of a sacred promise and the great disadvantages which must follow to her through life." Id. at 91. The court went on to say that "such a sum...
would mark (the jury's) disapprobation, and be an example to others." Id.
36

See Miller, slpra note 19, at 524-525 (citing SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supranote 19, § 1.4(A)).

37

See id.

38

See id.

39

Day v. Woodsworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 (1851).
We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers;
but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best
exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument. By the common
as well as by statute law, men are often punished for aggravated misconduct or lawless
acts by means of civil action and the damages inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the party injured.
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went on to say that "[i]t is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case of torts a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view
the enormity of his offence [sic] rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff. ' 40 However, the United States Supreme Court has recently noted that "the
Day case did not present any issue of punitive damages; the Court discussed them
'
merely as a sidelight to the costs-and-fees issue presented. 41
Nonetheless, the doctrine of punitive damages is now firmly rooted in American jurisprudence.
Generally, punitive damages are supposed to punish the defendant and deter that defendant and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.42 Other
policies for the doctrine rationalize that punitive awards also provide compensation
for uncompensable loss and protection for the consumer.4 3 Forty-seven states allow
for the assessment of punitive damages.' However, the standard of conduct necessary to warrant assessment of puniti ve damages varies from state to state. 45 Generally, it must be proven that the defendant's actions constituted at least one of the
following: (1) malice, (2) conduct exceeding gross negligence but not requiring
malice, (3) gross negligence, or (4) various statutorily defined requirements. 6
Due to concern that punitive damages are "run[ning] wild,, 47 many of the
states allowing punitive damages have attempted to limit the amount of punitive
damages that may be assessed through various means.4 8 For example, some states
use a bifurcated trial where juries first determine a defendant's liability and amount
of compensatory damages, and then assess punitive damages only after the defenId. See generally Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co.
v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
40

Id.

41

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 41 (1983) (affirming the awarding of punitive damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and the common law scheme to determine the amount of the award).
42
See Brian Timothy Beasley, Survey, North Carolina'sNew Punitive Damages Statute: Who's
Being Punished Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2188 (1996) [hereinafter Beasley]. "Courts widely agree
that these two purposes are the definitive goals of punitive damages." Id, at 2175 n.17. See also International
Brotherhood of Electric Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (stating that punitive awards are civil fines
imposed to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter such conduct in the future).
See Prater, supra note 21, at 1034-1037. Connecticut and Michigan both consider that a primary
purpose of punitive damages is to compensate for otherwise uncompensable loss. See id.at 1034.

43

See Beasley, supra note 42, at 2202-13. Punitive damages are constitutionally prohibited in Nebraska. NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; See Distinctive Printing and Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566,
573-74 (1989).
Punitive damages are outlawed in New Hampshire. See N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16
(1986). Washington has prohibited punitive damages. See Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072,
1073-74 (Wash. 1891).
See Id. (listing each state's conduct required of a defendant before punitive damages can be

44

awarded).
46

See Id. (listing conduct that must be shown in various states for ajury to assess punitive damages).

47

Pacific Mutual life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,18 (1991).

See Andrea A. Curico, Painful Publicity-An Alternate Punitive Damage Sanction, 45 DEPAUL L.
REV. 341, 353 n.31 (1996) [hereinafter Curico].

48
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dant is found liable.4 9 Many states have limited punitive awards by raising the standard of proof for finding conduct warranting punitive damages from a preponder0
ance of the evidence to the higher standard of clear and convincing proof." Some
state statutes that require part of the punitive damage award to be placed in a state
fund.51 Also, a few states have placed statutory maximums, or caps, on punitive
damages awards.5 2
Critics of placing caps on punitive damages contend that these caps give
"predictability to a doctrine whose real value lies in unpredictability. 5 3 They further argue that once an award becomes predictable, defendants, especially large
businesses, can simply absorb the cost of likely awards by factoring it into the cost
of doing business.5 Thus, corporations who can factor potential punitive damage
awards into their business expenses would not be deterred from producing an unsafe yet profitable product.5 5 These critics further argue that statutorily designated
punitive damage awards would unfairly disadvantage smaller businesses if they
were forced to pay the same amount of punitive damages as large businesses.'
Another criticism of unchecked punitive damages, particularly in the products liability area, is the potential chilling effect on new product research and development.57 Critics of the doctrine also point to the increasing costs and declining
availability of liability insurance resulting from the greater frequency and size of
punitive awards. 5a
Regardless of the policy arguments for and against punitive damages, both
proponents and critics alike should recognize that serious constitutional issues arise
whenever punitive damages are awarded.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In many states, juries are afforded nearly unlimited discretion in determining whether the conduct of the defendant entitles the plaintiff to a punitive damage

49

See King, supra note 33, at 337-38.

so

See Curico, supra note 48, at 353.

51

See id.

52

See Beasley, supra note 42, at 2202-13.

Id. at 2198, (citing Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, State Punitive Damages Statutes: A
ProposedAlternative, 20 J. LEGIS. 191,200 (1994)).
53

54

See id. at 2198.

55

See id.
See id. at 2198-99.

s6

See Blankenship v. General Motors Corp., 406 S.E. 2d 781, 783 n.4 (W.Va. 1991).
See Linda Himelstein, Jackpotsfrom Alabama Juries,Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 1994, at 83, 84 (noting
58
that ten insurance carriers were not getting involved with new businesses in Alabama as a result of large
punitive awards).

57
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award, and the amount of the award. 9 It is argued that such unbridled jury discretion violates due process because "the touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government." 60 As the frequency and size of
punitive damage awards has increased, the litigation surrounding punitive damages
has focused on whether such awards are constitutional.6' Punitive damage awards
have been attacked as unconstitutional under both the Eighth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendments.62
A. The Eighth Amendment Challenge
The Eighth Amendment came into effect in 1791 as a part of the Bill of
Rights. 63 In 1977, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings and "was only designed to protect those
convicted of crimes. 64 In the case of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie ("Lavoie"), the Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment challenge to
punitive damage awards was an important issue that should be dealt with when the
matter is brought before them in a proper case.65 Less than two years after Lavoie,
the Supreme Court again declined to address an Eighth Amendment challenge to a
punitive damage award in the case of Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw6
("Crenshaw"), because the issue was not properly raised in the lower court. 67

59

See Beasley, supra note 42, at 2201-2213 (reviewing standards of proof needed and restraints on
punitive damages among the various states).
60

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558

(1974)).
61

See Miller, supra note 19, at 524-525 (citing

BLATT,

supra note 20, at 26). See also Michael

Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, at 1309 (1993). Although punitive damage awards have increased in
frequency and amount, the modern function of the doctrine remains grounded in the historical function of
controlling the misuse of wealth and power. See id. It has been noted that this idea has been proliferated for
the protection of consumers from the abuses of the corporate world. See id.
62

See John Calvin Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.

REV. 139, 147-59 (commenting on both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to punitive damages).
63

The Eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
64

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 664 n. 40 (1977). "Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate

only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions." Id. at 67 1.
65

475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986). In Lavoie, the defendant contested a $3,500,000 punitive damage

award under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Id. at 828. It was unnecessary for the Court to address the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment Challenge because the case was remanded due to procedural error of the trial court where the
judge should have recused himself due to bias. See id. The Court noted that challenges to the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments "raised important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved." Id.
66

486 U.S. 71 (1988).

67

Id. at 77-78.
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68
In Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ("Browning-Ferris"), an
69
Eighth Amendment challenge was raised in an antitrust action. The Supreme
Court finally addressed the Eighth Amendment challenge and held that punitive
damages awarded in a civil suit between private parties are not constrained by the
Excessive Fines Clause. 70 The Court reasoned that the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment could not be violated by a punitive damage award "when
the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a
share of the damages awarded." 71 The Court noted that the history of the Eighth
to limit
Amendment "convinces us that the Excessive Fines Clause was intended
72
only those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government.,

B. The FourteenthAmendment Challenge

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenf is interpreted as
consisting of two parts, a substantive part and a procedural part.74 Procedural due
process examines whether the legal process was "fundamentally fair" and "rationally related to legitimate purposes," while a substantive due process analysis ques-

68

492 U.S. 257 (1989).

69

Id. at 259. In Browning-Ferris,the owner of a waste collection company received punitive dam-

ages from a defendant found in violation of antitrust law. Id. at 260. Browning-Ferris tried to fmonopolize a
local market by putting Kelco Disposal, its competitor, out of business. See id.
See id. at 275-76.
70
Id. at 264. But see Theodore B. Olson & Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., ConstitutionalRestraints on
the Doctrine of Punitive Damages, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 907 (1990). The authors suggest that the Eighth
Amendment argument could be analogized to the Court's reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974), where the Court held that punitive damage awards can't be given in libel cases absent actual
malice due to the chilling effect that such awards could have on free speech. See id. at 921. The authors
contend that since large awards threaten the First Amendment protection of free speech through selfsuppression, such punitive awards similarly threaten the values protected by the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. See id.
71

Id. at 268. The Court found that the language and history of the Eighth Amendment addressed
bails, fines, and punishments, which were typically applicable to criminal cases. See id. at 262.
72
73

Section One of The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
74

Substantive due process focuses on the size of the award in determining whether the award is an
arbitrary deprivation of property. See TXO Production Corp, 509 U.S. at 453-54. Procedural due process in
a punitive damages setting concentrates on subjects such as proper jury instructions and post-verdict mechanisms for reviewing the award at the trial court and appellate levels. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-21. See also
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (describing the distinction between the two ideas of due
process).
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tions whether the law itself that was applied was reasonable. 75 Thus, under a substantive due process framework, if the law is irrational and has deprived an individual of their rights, then a due process violation has occurred regardless of the
fairness of the procedures administering that law.

Since the early twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the substantive component of the Due Process clause guards
against awards which are "grossly excessive" 76 or "plainly arbitrary and oppressive., 77 Nevertheless, until the 1996 case of BMW ofNorth America, Inc., v. Gore7
("BMW'), the Supreme Court had not actually set aside a punitive damage award
for being "grossly excessive" since 1915.79
The Supreme Court had declined to rule on the due process issues raised in
both Lavoie or Crenshaw.80 However, the Browning-Ferris Court clearly recognized in dictum that authority exists 81 supporting the argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment places "outer limits" on the amount of punitive damages awarded.82
Again the Court refused to address the Fourteenth Amendment challenge because
the petitioner failed to raise the issue in the lower court or in its petition for certiorari.83 Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined in concurrence, stated:
75

Miller, supra note 19, at 528 (citing BLATT, supra note 20, at 27).

76

Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909) (stating that the Supreme court will not

interfere with awards unless the fines were so "grossly excessive as to become a deprivation of property
without due process of law").
Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 490-91 (1915) (setting aside a $6,300
punitive damage award the Court held that where the defendant was acting in good faith, with no intent to
harm, that the punitive damage award was "so plainly arbitrary and oppressive" as to amount to an arbitrary
taking of property without due process of law); Missouri Pacific railway Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351
(1913) (overturning a statutory penalty of $500 against a common carrier who overcharged passengers $3.02
as it was "grossly" disproportionate to the actual damages and so "arbitrary and oppressive" as to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); But see St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v.
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 64-67 (1919) (upholding statutes authorizing passengers overcharged to recover
penalties from common carriers ranging from $50 to $300).
77

78

517 U.S. 559 (1996).

79

See Danaher, 238 U.S. at 490-91.

Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor remarked that the wholly standardless grant of discretion given juries
in the award of punitive damages presented the Court with a due process question that should be addressed
when a case appropriate for a determination of the issue was before it. See id.
80

81

Id. at 276. See, e.g., St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919).

82

Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77.
There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process Clause places
outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme,.
. but we have never addressed the precise question presented here: whether due process
acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of an
express statutory limit.

Id.
83

See id. at 277. The Supreme Court, in passing on the Fourteenth Amendment issue, indicated that
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"I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for a
holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages
in civil cases brought by private parties."" After Browning-Ferris, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in four cases involving due process challenges to punitive damages.aS One of these landmark cases originated in West Virginia. Prior to their decision in Vandevender, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals twice grappled with the law emerging from this period of Supreme Court
review in an attempt to ensure that West Virginia's punitive damage law did not
violate due process.8 7
1. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip88 ("Haslip"), the Court finally addressed whether a punitive damage award was "grossly excessive."8 9 The
plaintiffs claimed damages for fraud where an insurance agent collected premium
payments of the insureds but did not remit them to the insurers, thus allowing the
policies to lapse without any notice to the policyholder. 90 An Alabama jury
awarded the plaintiffs roughly $200,000 in compensatory damages and $840,000 in
punitive damages. 9' Pacific Mutual contended that the punitive damages awarded
were "the product of unbridled jury discretion" and faulty processes, and thus an
unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

excessive punitive damages violate due process by remarking that "it is not disputed that a jury award may
not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion, or if it was reached in proceedings lacking basic elements of fundamental fairness." Id. at 276-77.
84

Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible civil
damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids damage awards that are "grossly excessive' or "so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable."

Id. at 280-81..
85
See generally BMW, 517 U.S. 559; Oberg, 512 U.S. 415; TXO, 509 U.S. 443;
Haslip, 499 U.S.
1.
86
See generally TXO, 509 U.S. 443.
See generally Alkire v. First National Bank of Parsons, 475 S.E. 2d 122 (W.Va.
1996); Games v.
Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E. 2d 897 (W.Va. 1991).
88
499 U.S. 1.
87

s9

Id. at 18.

See id. at 5-6. The facts showed that Haslip was hospitalized, and because the hospital was
unable
to verify her health insurance, it obtained a judgment against her. See id. Haslip brought suit alleging fraud
on Pacific Mutual's part because its agent had pocketed the premiums, causing her health insurance to lapse.
See id. at 6. The case went to the jury based on respondeat superiorand on appeal the Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed the verdict. See Haslip,499 U.S. at Z
90

91

See id. at 8.
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ment.92

The United States Supreme Court upheld the award, recognizing that unlimited discretion in assessing punitive damages "may invite extreme results that
jar one's constitutional sensibilities. '3 However, the Court went on to say that
"[w]e need not, and indeed cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case., 94 The Court stated that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate jury guidance from the court should be properly kept in mind when reviewing
the constitutionality of a punitive damage award. 95 After acknowledging the consistent history of the doctrine which was well established even before the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the common-law method for
assessing punitive damages is not so inherently unfair as to deny due process and
be per se unconstitutional. 96 The Court engaged in a very restrained substantive due
process review that looked at the ratio of punitive damages to the compensatory
award, but chose to focus their attention on the procedures
used by the Alabama
97
Supreme Court in a procedural due process analysis.
After examining the procedures that the Alabama Supreme Court used in
reviewing punitive damages, the Supreme Court explicitly found that the jury instructions placed reasonable constraints on the jury's discretion, the trial court's
post-verdict hearing ensured meaningful and adequate review of the award, and the
petitioner received the benefit of appropriate review by the state Supreme Court. 98
Thus, the Court held that the punitive award was not an arbitrary deprivation of
property because Alabama's procedural safeguards provided Pacific Mutual with
the requisite procedural due process. 99
First, the Court specifically found that the instructions given the jury confined them to the state policy concerns of punishment and deterrence by expressly
describing the purposes and factors to consider in assessing punitive damages, thus

92

Id. at 7-8.

93

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 212 U.S. at 11I).

94

Id. at 18.

95

See id. at 18-19.

See id. at 17-18. The common law method for assessing punitive damages was well established
before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, and nothing in that Amendment's text or history indicates an intention by the drafters to overturn the prevailing method. See id. But see Williams v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 239 (1970) (remarking that "[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative
and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack .... ).
97
See id. at 19-24. The necessary procedures include: proper jury instructions considering punitive
damages' purpose, availability of post-trial procedures and specific factors for a court to consider in reviewing punitive damage awards, the trial court's power to remit awards, and availability of appellate review. See
id.
98
See Haslip,499 U.S. at 22.
96

99

See id.
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giving them significant but not unlimited discretion.'0 0 The Court stated that if the
jury's discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, then due process is
satisfied.'0°
Second, the trial court's post-verdict review conformed with standards set
forth in the earlier Alabama case of Hammond v. City of Gadsden0 2 ("Hammond").
In Hammond,the Alabama Supreme Court stated that trial courts are to show in the
record the reasons for interfering with or upholding a jury verdict on grounds of
excessiveness of the damages, providing a list of factors appropriate for the trial
court's consideration.l The Supreme Court believes that the Hammond test ensures meaningful and adequate review by the trial court whenever a jury has
awarded punitive damageslt 4
Third, the Supreme Court found that the Alabama Supreme Court provides
an additional check on the jury's discretion by applying detailed substantive standards developed via the Hammond standards, as well as all relevant factors recited
in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby1 5 ("Green Oil"), to ensure that punitive damages are
reasonable.c 8 This test is known in Alabama as the Green Oil test.' 07 These standards were enumerated and refined by the Alabama Supreme Court to determine
a punitive award is reasonably related to the goals of retribution and deterwhether
10
rence. B

100

See id. at 19. The Court further noted that the instructions enlightened the jury as to punitive

damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment for the civil wrong, and explained that

the imposition of the penalty was not compulsory. See id. at 19. The Court stated that these instructions
reasonably accommodated Pacific Mutual's interest in rational decision making and the State's interest in
meaningful assessment of appropriate retribution and deterrence. See id. at 20. The discretion granted for
determining punitive damages under Alabama law is similar to many familiar areas of the law, such as deter-

mining "the best interests of the child," or "reasonable care," or "due diligence," or proper compensation for
pain an suffering or mental anguish. Id.
See id. at 20.
101
102

493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986).

103

Id. at 1379. Some of the factors deemed appropriate for the trial court's consideration include:

"the culpability of the defendant's conduct," the "desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct,"

the "impact upon the parties," and "other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties." Id.
104

See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.

105

539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1999).

106

See Haslip,499 U.S. at 22.

107

See David Carr & Rachel Sanders Cochran, Punitive Damages and Pre-VerditProcedures,Life

of Georgia: A Bold New Frontier,57 ALA. LAW 225, 225-28 (1996) (giving a general background on the
punitive damages procedures used in Alabama as well as a history of the Green Oil test).
103
See Central Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Tarpley, 546 So. 2d 371, 376-77 (Ala. 1989);

Hornsby, 539 So. 2d at 223-24. The following could be taken into consideration when determining whether
an award was excessive or inadequate: (1) whether there is a reasonable correlation between the punitive
damage award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the actual harm; (2) the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness,
any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (3) the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant also
sustain a loss; (4) the financial position of the defendant; (5) the costs of litigation; (6) the imposition of
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The Haslip Court concluded that the application of these standards imposes a significantly definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive damages.'0 9 The Court stated that Alabama's standards provide for a rational relationship in determining whether a particular award is greater than reasonably necessary to punish and deter."0 Although
the punitive damage award in Haslip far exceeded the amount of any fine that could
be imposed and was more than four times the compensatory damages, the Court
found that the award did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety," but "may be close to the line."'11
The Haslip case was decided, essentially, on procedural due process
grounds, and although no test was established for substantive due process violations, the Court's statement that a four-to-one punitive to compensatory ratio may
be "close to the line" appeared to enhance the likelihood that someday an award
would be set aside as "grossly excessive."
2. Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc.
The West Virginia case of Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc."2 ("Games"),
was remanded by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of
the Haslip decision.' 1 3 The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed based on
Haslip,114 holding that a jury may not award punitive damages without finding any
compensatory damages. 5 The Games Court found that the guidelines used by the
trial court in reviewing the award1 6"were neither meaningful nor adequate under the
standards established in Haslip.'
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be considered in mitigation; and (7) other civil
awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also to be considered in mitigation. See Green Oil,
539 So. 2d at 223-24.
109
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
110

See id. The Court stated that "[tihe Alabama Supreme Court's post-verdict review ensures that

punitive damage awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory damages." Id. These standards, when used in post-verdict review,
have resulted in reduction of punitive awards. See, e.g., Wilson v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70, 74 (Ala.
1989); United Services Automobile Assn. v. Wade, 544 So. 2d 906, 917 (Ala. 1989).
IHf

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24.

112

413 S.E. 2d 897 (W.Va. 1991).

113

Id. at 900.

114

See id.

115

See id. at 909 (overruling Syllabus Point Three of Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E. 2d 872 (W.Va. 1982)).

116

Id. at 908. The trial court limited its review to very unrestrictive standards, stating that "[c]ourts

must not set aside jury verdicts as excessive, unless they are monstrous, enormous, beyond all measure,
unreasonable, outrageous, and manifestly show jury passion, impartiality [sic], prejudice or corruption."
Games, 413 S.E.2d at 908 (citing Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E. 2d 710 (1988)). The trial court
further stated that "[o]nly where the award of punitive damages has no foundation in the evidence so as to
evince passion, prejudice or corruption in the jury should the award be set aside as excessive." Id. (citing
Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E. 2d 872).
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Therefore, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals announced a new
system for the review of punitive damages in West Virginia, bringing West Virginia law in line with Haslip.'1 7 The Court in Games noted that "although Haslip
may not have created the clear, bright line rules that we would all like, it is the beginning of national common law development in this area and not the end."1 18 The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the guidelines established
through the Alabama cases bf Hammond and Green Oil which focus concern on
placing reasonabfe constraint on jury discretion and providing meaningful and adequate trial court and appellate review." 9
The Games Court revamped the instructions to the jury, noting that the
court should carefully explain the factors to be considered in assessing punitive
damages.120 These factors, inferred from Haslip, are the principles which instruct
the jury as well as guide the post-verdict trial and appellate review. 21 A West Virginia fact finder should consider the following factors: (1) punitive damages should
bear a reasonable correlation to the potential and actual harm; (2) the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (3) if the defendant profited from the wrongful conduct; (4) punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory
damages; and (5) the defendant's financial position. 122 The Games Court noted that
the U. S. Supreme Court was satisfied that the Alabama jury instructions which
described the purposes of punitive damages, provided reasonable limits on jury
discretion
and thereby satisfied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend23
ment.1
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further required that West
Virginia trial courts thoroughly set out the reasons for changing or upholding a
reviewed award. 124 This principle was articulated by the Alabama Supreme Court
in Hammond,12 and upheld by the Supreme Court which found that the Hammond
guidelines
insured a meaningful and adequate review of an award by the trial
126
court.

When a West Virginia trial court engages in the review of an award it
should consider not only the factors explained to the jury but the following factors,
as well: (1) the costs of litigation; (2) any criminal sanctions; (3) any other similar
117

See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W.Va. 1991).

118

Id. at 907.

119

See id. at 908.

120

Id. at 908-909.

121

See id. at 909.

122

See Games, 413 S.E.2d at 909.

123

Id. at 904.

124

See id. at 910.

125

493 S.E. 2d at 1379.

126

See Haslip,499 U.S. at 20.
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civil actions; and (4) the appropriateness of punitive damages to encourage fair and
reasonable settlements when a clear wrong has been committed. 2 r The Games
Court found that the detailed trial court and appellate review provided by the Alabama Supreme Court by its use of the Green Oil test is important in guaranteeing
due process by insuring "that awards do not exceed
an amount that will accomplish
' 28
society's goals of punishment and deterrence.'
After the trial court has examined and ruled on the award, the losing party
may petition for appeal. 29 When reviewing the petition, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals will consider the same factors considered by the jury and trial
court.1 30 All petitions must address each and every factor, as assignments of error
related to a factor not specifically addressed in the petition will be waived.' 3'
The West Virginia Supreme Court further noted that Haslip offers more
than mere platitudes and represents a major step in the unification of America's
decisional law on punitive damages where the separate states are unable to craft a
set of rational rules.1 32 The Court in Games noted that at least two courts have cited
Haslip in overturning punitive awards. 3 The Games Court also discussed the importance of deterrence and its emerging prevalence in product liability cases.' 34
However, the Games Court recognized that while punitive damage awards can
serve an important regulatory function as with the Ford Pinto automobile, unchecked punitive awards can
have a detrimental, chilling effect on new product
5
research and development. 1
The West Virginia Supreme Court recognized that due process demands
not only that penalties be abstractly fair, but also that a person not be punished
without reasonable warning of the consequences of the wrongful conduct.1 36 The
Green Oil factors, which take into consideration the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, the duration of this conduct, the degree of awareness of
any hazard, any concealment of that hazard, and the existence and frequency of

127

See Games, 413 S.E.2d at 909.

128

Id. at 905.

129

See id.at 910.

130

See id.

131

See td.

132

See Games.413 S.E.2d at 905-06.

133
Id. See generally Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F. 2d 95 ( 'h Cir. 1991); Alexander &
4
Alexander, Inc., v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc., 596 A. 2d 687 (Md. 1991).

134

Games 413 S.E. 2d at 902.

135

Id. A court in California awarded $125 million in punitive damages (later remitted to $3.5 mil-

lion) to discourage Ford from future similar acts when it found that Ford knew that the gas tanks in its Pinto
automobiles were dangerously defective, but chose not to redesign them because the costs of losing lawsuits
when a few people died was cheaper than recalling the defective vehicles. See id.(citing Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Company. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757 (Cal. 1981).
136
See id. at 909.
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similar past conduct, seem to further the due process goal of assuring that the defendant had notice.
While the incorporation of the Haslip standards represents an attempt to
establish criteria for determining whether a particular award is violative of due
process, the protections gained in West Virginia are, as in Haslip, primarily procedural. The factors which consider the size of the award itself, such as the requirement that punitive awards bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages
as well as the actual and potential harm caused by the defendant's conduct, may
afford at least some measure of substantive due process analysis in determining if
the award was fundamentally fair. Therefore, a court may determine that the mechanical process by which the law was applied is fair and satisfies procedural due
process, but may alter the result by finding a substantive due process violation.
As there is no standard for determining the reasonableness of the law itself,
the court cannot engage in a substantive due process review of the abstract law of
punitive damages because the common law exists as it is applied to a particular set
of facts. Thus, a substantive due process review within a punitive damages framework amounts to an assessment by the court of whether the common law, as applied to the particular case, resulted in a fair decision. In other words, if a court
finds that a punitive damage award violates substantive due process, it appears that
the court is merely replacing the reasoning of the jury with their own, and thus subverting the role of the jury.
3. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.
Less than two years after stating that a four-to-one ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages ran "close to the line," the United States Supreme Court, in
a plurality opinion, affirmed a 526-to-one ratio in the West Virginia case of TXO
Production. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.1 37 ("TXO"), where the punitive
damages amounted to $10 million and the compensatory damages were only
$19,000.138
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the award violated
due process on the grounds that it was either excessive or the product of unfair
procedure, thus promising both a substantive and procedural due process analysis. 139 The Court again remarked that the Due Process Clause places "substantive
limits beyond which penalties may not go. ' 140 However, the Court restated their
unwillingness to "draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally

137

509 U.S. at 443.

138

Id. at 446. The punitive award was "over 20 times greater than any punitive damages award in

West Virginia history, and 10 times greater than the largest punitive damages award for slander of title in any
jurisdiction." Miller, supra note 19, at 173 (quoting ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
FOR FRAUD § 7.20, at 334 (2d ed. 1995)).

See id. at 446. TXO contended that the punitive damage award violated the Due Process Clause
because the award was excessive or resulted from unfair procedure. See id.
140
Id. at 453-54 (citing Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
139
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acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. 141 The
Court noted that "no two cases are truly identical," and thus, "meaningful comparisons of punitive damage awards are difficult to make. 142
The Court declined to create an objective test for examining the constitutionality of punitive damage awards, instead choosing to look at the award with a
general "concern for reasonableness in mind., 143 A reasonableness analysis is an
intermediate standard of review where, in a punitive damages setting, the legitimate
interests of the state are balanced against the interests of the party at fault on whom
the loss falls.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the punitive
award 144 where TXO, an oil and gas developer, was found liable for slander of title. 145 In reviewing this decision, the United States Supreme Court employed a reasonable relationship test which considered the potential harm that TXO could have

caused, the maliciousness of the conduct,
and the punishment necessary to discour46
age similar misconduct in the future.1
In rejecting TXO's due process claim, the Court noted the dramatic disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award, but justified their decision
due to the "amount of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of petitioner, the
fact that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud,
trickery and deceit, and petitioner's wealth. 1 47 The Court approved of considering
141

Id. at 458 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).

142

TXO, 509 U.S. at 457.

143

Id. at 458 (citing Haslip,499 U.S. at 18). The Court was urged by respondents to adopt a rational

basis standard which it rejected stating "that apparently any award that would serve the legitimate state interest in deterring or punishing the wrongful" act would be acceptable regardless of its size. Id. at 456. The
Court also rejected the use of heightened scrutiny to review punitive awards as unnecessary because of the
built-in safeguards of the jury system. See id. at 456-57. The Court further remarked that "[aissuming that
fair procedures were followed. ajudgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption
of validity." Id. at 457.
144
See id. at 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that, unfortunately for TXO, the Games case was
decided after TXO's trial took place and, although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized
that TXO did not get the protections of Games and Haslip, it refused to remand the case, indicating it would
be "especially diligent" in reviewing the award, and reciting language from both Games and Haslip).
145
See id. at 452. TXO filed suit requesting a declaratory judgment to clear the title of an interest in
oil and gas rights, and Alliance counterclaimed for slander of title. See id. at 447. The trial court awarded
Alliance costs for defending the declaratory judgment action and $10.000,000 in punitive damages. See id. at
451.
146

See id. at 453 (citing TXO, 419 S.E. 2d at 889).

147

TIXO. 509 U.S. at 462.
The type of fraudulent action intentionally undertaken by TXO in this case could potentially cause millions of dollars in damages to other victims. As for the reprehensibility
of TXO's conduct, we can say no more than we have already said, and we believe the
jury's verdict says more than we could say in an opinion twice this length. Just as important, an award of this magnitude is necessary to discourage TXO from continuing its
pattern and practice of fraud, trickery, and deceit.

Id. at 453 (quoting TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 889).
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the potential harm that might result from the defendant's conduct as being consistent with the decision in Haslip.148 Thus, the Court did not consider the substantial
difference between the actual damages and the punitive damages to be controlling
in a case of this character. 149 The Court rejected TXO's argument that they were
given no notice of the possibility that the award could be divorced from a compensatory award, by stating that "the notice component of the Due Process Clause is
satisfied if prior law fairly indicated that a punitive award might be imposed in
response to egregiously tortious conduct.!"so
Although the plurality promised both substantive and procedural due process analysis,' 5' the Court again merely acknowledged that due process puts substantive limits on punitive awards,' 5 2 and reaffirmed the procedural standards from
Haslip without providing any guidance as to when an award may be "grossly excessive."' 53
The Court provided no new guidance to characterize the vague standard of
"reasonableness," and instead decided the case on its particular facts.'-r Thus, after
148

See id. at 460. The Alabama Supreme Court had previously stated that one of the factors for

review of a punitive damage award to be considered was "whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm
that actually occurred." Id., citing Haslip,499 U.S, at 21.
149 .
See id. at 462. The Court in TXO decided that the plaintiff's actual damages could have reached
"$4 million, or $2 million, or even $I million" and therefore reduced the 526-to-one ratio considerably. Id. at
462. Justice O'Connor disagreed with this line of reasoning, stating that "the potential harm theory is little
more than an after-the-fact rationalization invented by counsel to defend this startling award on appeal" and
was never directed to the jury's attention. Id. at 484-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Iso

Id. at 465-66.

1s1

See id. at 472-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that in Haslip the Court held out the
promise that punitive damage awards would receive proper constitutional scrutiny to prevent what is becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system, and that today's judgment renders Haslip's promise a false one).
152
See TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-54. Justice Scalia, who has consistently stated that substantive due
process is an oxymoron, stated that the "Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite its textual
limitation to procedure, incorporates certain substantive guarantees specified in the Bill of Rights; but I do not
accept the proposition that it is the secret repository of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive rights ...
Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
It is particularly difficult to imagine that "due process" contains the substantive right
not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages, since if it contains that it would
surely also contain the substantive right not to be subjected to excessive fines, which
would make the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment superfluous in light
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring). "To say (as I do) that 'procedural due process' requires judicial review of
punitive damages awards for reasonableness is not to say that there is a federal constitutional right to a substantively correct 'reasonableness' determination-which is, in my view, what the plurality tries to assure
today." Id. at 471 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that he could not "join the plurality opinion, since it makes explicit what was implicit in Haslip:the existence of a so-called 'substantive due process'
right that punitive damages be reasonable." Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153
See Id. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that "the plurality opinion
erects not a single guidepost to help other courts guide their way through this area." TXO, 509 U.S. at 480
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
154

See id. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "the plurality abandons all pretense of pro-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:523

Haslip and TXO, the Supreme Court's focus on the "reasonableness" of the award
provided a reviewing court little more guidance than its own subjective reaction to
the result of an application of existing punitive damages law to the specific facts of
the case. 155 The significance of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages,
along with the apparent beginnings of a substantive due process analysis in Haslip,
were both clouded by the TXO decision.
4. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg
One year after their decision in TXO, the United States Supreme Court
again attempted to clarify the punitive damages dilemma in the products liability
case of HondaMotor Co. v. Oberg1 56 ("Oberg"). Honda was found liable for manufacturing a defective three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle and Oberg was awarded
$919,390 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages.157 Honda
claimed that the punitive award was excessive and that "Oregon courts lacked
the
1 58
power to correct excessive verdicts" thus violating Honda's due process rights.

The Court again reaffirmed that substantive due process places limits on
the size of punitive damages.1 5 9 However, as that issue was not properly before the

Court, it did not address the criteria for reviewing whether a punitive award is unconstitutionally excessive, and focused only on Oregon's lack of common-law procedures160 The Court stressed the importance of the procedural component of the
Due Process Clause to guard against arbitrary deprivations of property.161 The
Court cautioned that "[j]ury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts.1 6 2 As a result, jury awards of punitive damages "pose an

viding instruction and moves directly into the specifics of this case").
See id. at 466-467 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]his type of review,
far from imposing meaningfil, law-like restraints on jury excess, could become as fickle as the process it is
designed to superintend. Furthermore, it might give the illusion ofjudicial certainty where none in fact exists, and, in so doing, discourage legislative intervention that might prevent unjust punitive awards." Id. at
467 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1s5

156

512 U.S. 415 (1994). Oberg was injured while riding a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle; Oberg

sued under a products liability theory. See id. at 418.
157

See id.
at418.

158

Id.

159

See id.

160

See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 420. The Court stated that "[ln the case before us today we are not di-

rectly concerned with the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards;
rather, we are confronted with the question of what procedures are necessary to ensure that punitive damages
are not imposed in an arbitrary manner." Id.
161

See id. at 420. The Court stated that "[t]he
opinions in both Haslip and TXO strongly emphasized

the importance of the procedural component of the Due Process Clause." Id. The Court noted that "judicial
review of the size of punitive damage awards has been a safeguard against excessive verdicts for as long as
punitive damages have been awarded." Id,at 421.
162

Oberg. 512 U.S. at 432.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss3/6

20

Hicks: Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.: A Closer Look at the Framework for R
VANDEVENDER v. SHEETZ INC.

1999]

1 63

acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property."
An amendment to Oregon's Constitution prohibited judicial review of punitive damages awarded by ajury unless the court could affirmatively say that there
was no evidence to support the verdict. 164 The Court reversed and remanded the
case to the Oregon Supreme Court, holding that Oregon's prohibition of judicial
review denied Honda their due process rights. 165 Thus, the amendment to the Oregon Constitution was struck down as unconstitutional because it was inconsistent
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'r
The Oberg decision demonstrated that an absence of common law procedures for judicial review overcomes the. presumption of validity given most jury
verdicts, and gives rise to a presumption of a violation of the Due Process
Clause. 67 Although the Oberg Court once again asserted that substantive due process indeed places limits on punitive damage awards, because the case was decided
on procedural grounds, the Court offered no standards or guidance to determine
when an award is "grossly excessive."
Haslip, TXO, and Oberg laid the foundation for the Supreme Court to address whether due process placed substantive limits on the size of punitive damages. The appropriate facts for dealing168with this issue finally arrived in the case of
BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore.
5. BMW ofNrth America, Inc., v. Gore
In BMW, 6 9 the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four opinion, held that the
$2,000,000 punitive damage award was so "grossly excessive as to transcend the
constitutional limit. 170 BMW sold a car to Dr. Gore without revealing that its original finish had been repainted due to acid rain damage.17' The Alabama jury
163

Id.

164

The amendment stated:
In actions of law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-

examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no
evidence to support the verdict.
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3.

See Oberg, 512 U.S. at 432 and 435. The Supreme Court noted that "Oregon's abrogation of a
well-established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations of property raises a presumption that
its procedures violate the Due Process Clause" Id. at 430.
165

166

See id. at 432.

167

Id. at 430.

168

517 U.S. 559.

169

Id.

170

Id. at 585-86.

171

See id. at 563. The facts established that after driving the vehicle for roughly nine months and

noticing no flaws in its finish, Dr. Gore took the car to "Slick Finish," an independent detailer, which noticed
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awarded Dr. Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive
damages, finding that BMW's disclosure policy amounted to "gross, oppressive or
malicious" fraud under the Alabama statute.172
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2,000,000,173
finding that the jury improperly calculated the award amount by multiplying Dr.
Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in other jurisdictions. 174 The Alabama Supreme Court's explanation of their remittitur expressly
disclaimed any reliance on other jurisdictional acts,'75 but did not indicate whether
the $2,000,000 represented an independent assessment of the proper amount of
punitive damages or a finding of the maximum award allowable under the Due
Process Clause. 176
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to help illuminate when a punitive
award is unconstitutionally excessive. 7 7 The Court began its excessiveness inquiry
with an identification of the state interests that punitive damages are intended to
protect. 7 8 The Court acknowledged that punitive damage awards advance the legitimate state interests of punishing and deterring wrongful conduct. 179 However,
the Court further recognized that when a punitive award may fairly be categorized
as "grossly excessive" in relation to the state's interests, the award violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80
Although the Court acknowledged that Alabama had a legitimate interest
in shielding its residents from deceptive trade practices, it held that the Alabama
court could protect the interests of its citizens only.18 ' Thus, the punitive award
could not be based on BMW's actions in other jurisdictions because Alabama had
that the car had been repainted. Id.
172

BMW, 51:7 U.S. at 565. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-21 (1993).

173

In ordering the remittitur, the Alabama Supreme Court held "that a constitutionally reasonable

punitive damages award in this case is $2,000,000." Id. 567 (citing, BM/ of North America, Inc., v. Gore,
646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994)).
174

See id. at 567.

175

See id.

176

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 567 n.10.

177

See id. at 568.

178

See id.

179

See id.
In our federal system, states necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the
level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any
particular case. Most states that authorize exemplary damages afford the jury similar
latitude, requiring only that the damages awarded be reasonably necessary to vindicate
the state's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.

Id (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 456; Hoslip, 499 U. S. at 21,22).
M
181

BMW. 517 U.S. at 568 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 456).
See id. at 567-73
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82
no authority to interfere with the policies of other states. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the award must be reviewed based on BMW's actions in Alabama,
83
as opposed to the interests of consumers nationwide.
The Court continued their analysis by addressing the argument that BMW
failed to receive fair notice not only of the conduct which would subject them to
84
penalty but also of the harshness of the punishment that Alabama might impose.
In deciding that BMW did not receive adequate notice, the Court announced three
factors, or "guideposts," for determining whether a defendant received adequate
85
notice of the size of the penalty that might be assessed.1 The three "guideposts"
were announced as follows: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct; (2) the ratio of actual and potential harm to the punitive damages awarded;
and (3) the difference between the punitive remedy and the civil penalties authorized in similar cases.as Application of these three factors led the Court to conclude
that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the penalty Alabama might impose,
and that the punitive award was grossly excessive.' 87
The Court stated that the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct may be the most significant consideration in examining the reasonableness of
a punitive award.' 88 The Court noted that the record reveals no deliberate false
statements, intentional misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive, such as were found in Haslip and TXO. 18 9 The Supreme Court found that because none of the aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible
conduct were present, BMW's conduct was not deserving of the $2,000,000 penalty. 190
The Court next addressed the ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages. 91 The Court concluded that the disparity in this case was dramatically

See id. The Court noted that "[t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." Id. at 573 n.19 (citing Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 537, 363 (1978)). While "Congress has ample authority to enact such a policy for the entire
nation, it is clear that no single state could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on neighboring
at 571.
states." Id.
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 572-73. Alabama can require BMW to adhere to its own disclosure policy,
183
182

but it cannot punish BMW for lawful conduct in other states. See id. at 571-572.
184

See id. at 574.

185

Id. at 574-75.

186

Id.

187

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75.

ss

See id. at 575.

189

See id. at 579 (citing Haslip,499 U.S. at 5; TXO, 509 U.S. at 453).

190

See id. at 576. The Court found that the harm BMW inflicted on Dr. Gore was purely economic in

nature and showed no reckless disregard for the health and safety of others, and thus was not sufficiently
reprehensible to justify a significant penalty in addition to compensatory damages. See id.
191
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 580. The Court noted that this consideration is perhaps the most commonly
cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive award. See id.
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greater than those considered in Haslip and TXO. 192 The Court stressed that they
have consistently rejected the idea that a constitutional line may be marked by a
simple mathematical formula, however, the disparity between
193 Dr. Gore's actual
harm and the punitive award measuring 500-to-I was suspect.
Lastly, the Court analyzed the punitive award in relation to the possible
civil and criminal sanctions for similar wrongful conduct. 194 As the punitive award
in BMW greatly exceeded any of the statutory penalties available in Alabama or
any other state,' 95 the Court found the punitive award excessive because a lesser
sanction could have compelled BMW to comply with Alabama's policies.1
After several previous assertions that the Due Process Clause places substantive limits on punitive damage awards, the Court in BMW finally held that a
punitive award exceeded constitutional limits. 1 97 The Court set out a two-step
analysis requiring that a court identify the state interests a punitive award is designed to serve, 198 and then determine, by applying the three "guideposts," whether
the defendant was on notice that it could be subject to the amount of damages assessed.1 99

Although it remains unclear exactly how big a punitive award must be before it is too big, 200 the Court seemingly has provided additional guidance in the
192

See id. at 582.

193

See id. at 583. The Court reiterated its rejection of a categorical approach, noting that:
Low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high
compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine.

Id. at 582.
194
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583. Justice O'Connor noted that a court reviewing whether a punitive
damage award is excessive should "accord 'substantial deference' to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue." Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).

i95

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 583-84. The Court noted that the maximum fine available under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act was $2,000, and the most strict penalties of other states ranged from
$5,000 to $10.000. See id. at 584.
196
See id at 584-85.
197
See id. at 585-86. In his dissent, Scalia stated that "today's judgment represents the first instance
of this court's invalidation of a state-court punitive assessment as simply unreasonably large." Id. at 599
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
198
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
199

See id. at 574.

200

See id. at 613 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated:
The exercise is engaging. but ultimately tells us only this: too big will be judged unfair.
What is the Court's measure of too big? Not a cap of the kind a legislature could order,
or a mathematical test this Court can divine and impose. Too big is, in the end, the
amount which five Members of the court bridle.
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form of the three "guideposts. 20 ' These pliable factors refrain from setting mathematical limits on punitive awards while attempting to clarify standards for engaging
in a logical evaluation of whether a punitive award is sufficient to punish and deter
wrongful conduct or whether the award violates the defendant's due process rights.
At first glance, the BMW Court's three "guideposts" appear to be a mere
restatement of the existing practice. As a result, it appears that the Court's substantive due process analysis simply involves applying the same standards used by the
then replacing the jury's decision with its own when
jury and appellate courts, and
20 2
it disagrees with the verdict.
However, rather than placing these currently applied factors in a purely
procedural due process context as in Haslip, these three factors were utilized to
determine if the defendant received adequate notice of the conduct which would
subject it to penalty and of the size of the punishment that might be assessed. 0 3
Although the concern of adequate notice is certainly a procedural one, this analysis
forces the reviewing court to scrutinize the amount of the award itself. Therefore, in
applying the three "guideposts," a court looks directly at the amount of the punitive
damages awarded and decides if the penalty could fairly be imposed on the defendant.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in BMW, the meaning
of the vague terms "reasonableness ''204 and "grossly excessive' 205 remained confusing. The Court's lack of clarity regarding due process challenges to punitive damages left lower courts uncertain whether the Constitution assures defendants only
procedural rights, or substantive rights as well. BMW's announced "guideposts"
were intended to guide courts in assessing whether a punitive award crosses the
Constitutional line and becomes grossly excessive. Unfortunately, the inherent
flexibility of both the ratio and reprehensibility factors in particular allow courts to
Id. at n. 5. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201

See id. at 575. There have been several cases which have applied the three guideposts. Neibel v.

Trans World Assurance Co., 108 F.3d 1123, 1131-33 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the three BMW factors in
finding that the punitive damages award was not "grossly excessive", and thus did not offend the Fourteenth
Amendment); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809-12 (2d Cir. 1996) (the three factors identified in BMW in
finding a punitive award excessive); Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 943-44 (5th Cir.

1996) (stating that "the quantum of this award does not comply with the three factors set out by the Supreme
Court to determine the reasonableness of a punitive damages award"); Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v.

OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 636-41 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the Supreme Court in BMW"clarified in
several respects the legal standards to be applied" when reviewing a punitive award).
202

See BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia began his dissent by stating that

the Court's new rule of constitutional law is constrained by nothing but the Justices' subjective determination
of the reasonableness of the punitive award. See id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further
stated that the "decision, though dressed up in a legal opinion, is really no more than a disagreement with the
community's sense of indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama jury, as reduced
by the State Supreme Court." Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia remarked that the majority's
opinion is a "judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is hardly an analytical

determination." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203
See id. at 574.
204

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.

205

Waters-PierceOil Co., 212 U.S. at I1.
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2
make subjective determinations regarding an award's constitutionality. 0

6. Alkire v. First National Bank of Parsons
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals further clarified the West
Virginia standards used in reviewing punitive damage awards in the case of Alkire
20 7 ("Alkire"). In Alkire, the West Virginia Suv. First National Bank of Parsons
preme Court of Appeals reversed a circuit court decision that had vacated a punitive damage award. 20 8 After reviewing the record, the Alkire Court concluded that a
reasonable trier of fact could easily have returned a punitive damage award in favor
of Mr. Alkire.2 °9
The Court in Alkire followed the two-step paradigm of West Virginia punitive damage jurisprudence by first deciding if the defendant's conduct warranted
210
imposing punitive damages, and then reviewing the award for excessiveness.
After determining that Mr. Alkire was entitled to a punitive award, the Alkire Court
addressed the question of whether Mr. Alkire was entitled to the punitive award
returned by the jury.21 '
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declined to simply reinstate
the punitive damage award of $1,050,000 since it was imperative that the amount
of the punitive award be first reviewed by the trial court by applying the model
specified in Syllabus points three 212 and four 213 of Games and Syllabus Point fif206

See TXO, 509 U.S. at 480-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor warned that constitu-

tional judgments .'should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices."' Id. at
480 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977)) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "Without objective criteria on which to rely, almost any decision regarding proportionality will be a matter of personal preference. One judge's excess very well may be another's
dissenting).
moderation." Id. at 480-81 (O'Connor, J.,
207
475 S.E.2d 122 (W. Va. 1996). The facts of Alkire reveal that Mr. Alkire, an employee of the
Parsons Texaco, was to take the daily receipts and deposit them in a night depository of the defendant, First
at 125. Unfortunately, the Parsons Texaco deposit
National Bank of Parsons (hereinafter the Bank). See id.
was not found, and thus never logged into the Bank's records. See id. Following a criminal investigation, the
grand jury refused to charge Mr. Alkire with a crime. See id. However, the shadow of suspicion surrounding
Mr. Alkire resulted in ridicule, embarrassment and shame, ruining Mr. Alkire's reputation in the community.
See id.at 126. Nearly two and one-half years later, the Bank found the missing deposit, but chose not to
inform Mr. Alkire because, according to the Bank, Mr. Alkire was not the customer whose deposit was missing. See Alkire, 475 S.E.2d 122. After Mr. Alkire was anonymously informed of the recovery, he filed suit
against the Bank, alleging negligence, gross negligence and fraud. See id.The jury awarded Mr. Alkire
$210,000 in compensatory damages, and $1,050,000 in punitive damages. See id.
208

Id.at 131.

209

Id. at 129. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed their commitment to the

traditional rule, announcing the type of conduct necessary to find punitive damages "in actions of tort" as:
"gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil
obligations affecting the rights of others, or where legislative enactment authorizes it." Alkire, 475 S.E.2d
122 (citing Mayer v. Frobe, 22 S.E.2d 58, Syl. Pt. 4 (1895)).
210

Id. at Syl. Pt.7.

211

Id.at130.

212

See id. at130. Syllabus Point three of Games provides guidance to courts when instructing juries
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549

teen of TXO. 14 Since the trial court vacated the entire punitive award, no analysis
was made concerning the size of the award as required by the Games decision.2 15
Thus, the required excessiveness analysis needed to be made on remand.216 The
Alkire Court then reiterated that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will,
on determining the amount of punitive damages to award. It reads as follows:
When the trial court instructs the jury on punitive damages, the court should, at a minimum, carefully explain the factors to be considered in awarding punitive damages.
These factors are as follows: (I) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's conduct as well as to the
harm that actually has occurred. If the defendant's actions caused or would likely cause
in a similar situation only slight harm, the damages should be relatively small: If the
harm is grievous, the damages should be greater. (2) The jury may consider (although
the court need not specifically instruct on each element if doing so would be unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant), the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. The jury
should take into account how long the defendant continued in his actions, whether he
was aware his actions were causing or were likely to cause harm, whether he attempted
to conceal or cover up his actions or the harm caused by them, whether/how often the
defendant engaged in similar conduct in the past, and whether the defendant made reasonable efforts to make amends by offering a fair and prompt settlement for the actual
harm caused once his liability became clear to him. (3) If the defendant profited from
his wrongful conduct, the punitive damages should remove the profit and sho ld be in
excess of the profit, so that the award discourages future bad acts by the defendant. (4)
As a matter of fundamental fairness, punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. (5) The financial position of the defendant is relevant.
Alkire, 475 S.E.2d at 130-131 n.10.
213
See id. at 130. Syllabus Point four of Garnes instructs circuit courts on how to review the propriety of the amount of the punitive award and reads as follows:
When the trial court reviews an award of punitive damages, the court should, at a minimum, consider the factors given to the jury as well as the following additional factors:
(1) The costs of the litigation; (2) Any criminal sanctions imposed on the defendant for
his conduct; (3) Any other civil actions against the same defendant, based on the same
conduct; and (4) The appropriateness of punitive damages to encourage fair and reasonable settlements when a clear wrong has been committed. A factor that may justify
punitive damages is the cost of litigation to the plaintiff. Because not all relevant information is available to the jury, it is likely that in some cases the jury will make an
award that is reasonable on the facts as the jury know them, but that will require downward adjustment by the trial court through remittitur because of factors that would be
prejudicial to the defendant if admitted at trial, such as criminal sanctions imposed or
similar lawsuits pending elsewhere against the defendant. However, at the option of the
defendant, or in the sound discretion of the trial court, any of the above factors may also
be presented to the jury.
Id.at 131 n.10.
214

See id. at 130. Syllabus Point Fifteen of TXO provides as follows:
The outer limit of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in cases in
which the defendant has acted with extreme negligence or wanton disregard but with no
actual intention to cause harm and in which compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large is roughly 5 to 1. However, when the defendant has acted with actual
evil intention, much higher ratios are not per se unconstitutional.

Id.at 131 n.12.
215

See id. at 127.

216

See Id. at 131.
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upon petition, review the amount of the punitive award, applying the standard set
forth in Syllabus Point five of Games.217 The case was remanded to determine if
the punitive award of $1,050,000 was excessive in light of Syllabus Points three
21 8
and four of Games and Syllabus Point fifteen of TXO.
The Alkire Court solidified the West Virginia standards for jury instructions concerning punitive damages and clearly mandated that every post-trial review of punitive awards for excessiveness be conducted exclusively within the
boundaries of Games and TXO. 21 9 The Alkire decision reaffirmed West Virginia
punitive damages jurisprudence, setting the foundation for the analysis performed
in Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.
IV. VANDEVENDER V. SHEETZ, INC.
A. Facts andProceduralHistory
On June 8, 1989, Ms. Vandevender was hired as a salesperson by Sheetz
for one of its convenience stores.220 Six months later she was promoted to second
assistant manager.2 While at work on January 4, 1991, she injured her back while
trying to remove the lid from a large pickle jar. 2 Prior to her employment with
Sheetz, Ms. Vandevender had injured her back for which she had undergone back
surgery. 223 Ms. Vandevender continued working for several months, and was first
examined by a physician for the pickle jar injury on January 21, 1991.2 4 She successfully sought relief from the Worker's Compensation Fund and began receiving
temporary total disability benefits for the injury on July 30, 1991. .2 5 She underwent

217

Id. at 130-3 1. Syllabus Point five of Garnes reads as follows:
Upon petition, this Court will review all punitive damages awards. In our review of the
petition, we will consider the same factors that we require the jury and trial judge to
consider, and all petitions must address each and every factor set forth in Syllabus
Points 3 and 4 of this case with particularity, summarizing the evidence presented to the
jury on the subject or to the trial court at the post-judgment review stage. Assignments
of error related to a factor not specifically addressed in the petition will be deemed
waived as a matter of state law.

Alkire, 475 S.E.2d at 131 n.l I.
218

Id. at 131.

219

Id. at 130-31.

220

See Vandevender 490 S.E.2d at 682.

221

See id.

222

See id. at n.l.

223

See id. at n.2.

224

See id. at 682.

225

See id.
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back surgery for the injury on October 7, 1991.226
In late 1992, Ms. Vandevender informed her store manager, Ms. Foltz, that
she was able to return to work with a permanent limitation on heavy lifting.227 Ms.
Vandevender was told that she could not return to work until she was "100%,"
according to company policy.228 On March 15, 1993, Ms. Vandevender received a
letter from Sheetz stating its policy that a twelve-month absence from work is
treated as a resignation.229 The letter further stated that if she were able to work, she
should contact Sheetz' human resources department, and that she would be eligible
for rehire after obtaining a medical release subject to her qualifications and abilities
concerning her job duties and responsibilities.230 She did not contact Sheetz' human
resources department or Ms. Foltz after receipt of this letter. 231 Pursuant to Sheetz'
one-year absence policy, Ms. Vandevender was fired in March 1993.232
On December 1, 1994, Ms. Vandevender filed suit against Sheetz. She alleged a violation of the anti-discrimination provisions of the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act 233 ("Workers' Compensation Act").234 She also alleged an
action for refusing to rehire an employee fired after a work-related injury and for
refusing to consider a prior employee for rehire based on an actual or perceived
handicap in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act235 ("Human Rights
Act"). 23 6 During the discovery phase of litigation the store manager, Ms. Foltz,
testified that Ms. Vandevender could have been accommodated because the job
functions listed by Sheetz requiring employees to stand for eight hours a day and
lift up to fifty pounds were not actually essential.23 7 As a result of this discovery,
Ms. Vandevender demanded to be returned to her job.238

226

See id.

227

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 682-83.

229

Id. at 683.

229

See id. The letter regarding this policy stated that "[a]ny employee of Sheetz, Inc. who is absent

from work due to disability (either work related or non-work related) or illness for a total of twelve (12)
consecutive or non-consecutive months shall be considered to have resigned his or her employment with

Sheetz, Inc." I at n.4.
230

See id. at 683.

231

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 683.

232

See id. at 683.

233

W.VA. CODE §§ 23-5A-1 to -3 (1998).

234

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 683.

235

W.VA. CODE §§ 5-l 1-1to -19 (1994).

236

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 683.

237

See id. Ms. Foltz was fired five weeks after her deposition. See id. at n.7. The trial court, upon

objection of Sheetz' counsel for relevancy, prevented Ms. Vandevender's counsel from inquiring into the
basis of Ms. Foltz's firing. See id.
238

See id
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On February 3, 1995, Sheetz offered to hire Ms. Vandevender as a sales
clerk.239 She returned to work on April 17, 1995.240 On that day the regional manager, Ms. Imler, was present and demanded to be given a written list of Ms. Vandevender's work restrictions. 24 Although the regional manager was specifically
aware of the results of Ms. Vandevender's required medical examination one
month prior, Ms. Imler stated that until she received an updated doctor's slip, she
did not "see" any restrictions. 242 Ms. Imler ordered Ms. Vandevender to obtain a
new medical examination by Friday of the upcoming week, even though Ms. Vandevender was scheduled to work every day of that week.243 Although the store
manager, Randy Wallen, cautioned Ms. Vandevender not to lift anything, 244 the
regional manager ordered Ms. Vandevender to stock the cooler.245 After twenty
246
minutes of stocking the cooler, Ms. Vandevender had to stop due to back spasms.
She continued working for several more hours, but did not tell anyone of her back
pain.247 Ms. Vandevender informed Sheetz the next day that she would not be returning to work on advice of her lawyer.248
In June 1995, Ms. Vandevender amended her complaint to allege that
Sheetz violated the Human Rights Act by failing to accommodate her during the
period of 1991 to 1995.249 She further amended her complaint to allege that Ms.
Imler's request to stock the cooler was an unlawful reprisal 250 in violation of the
Human Rights Act.25 '
25 2
After a three-day trial the jury returned a verdict for Ms. Vandevender.
She was awarded $130,066 in compensatory damages, $170,000 for non-economic
damages, and $2,699,00 in punitive damages.253 Sheetz filed motions for judgment
239

See id.

240

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 683.

241

See id.Ms. Vandevender's work restrictions were that she could only lift fifteen pounds at a time

and that she had to use a stool to take periodic breaks from standing. See id. at 684 n.9.
242
Id. at 683-84.
243

See id. at 684.

244

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 684 n. 10.

245

See id. at 684.

See id.The record shows that Ms. Vandevender did not lift anything heavier than a six-pack or a
two-liter bottle of soda while stocking the cooler. See id. at n.l 1.
246
247

See id. at 684.

248

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 684.

249

See id.

250

See id.

251

W.VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (7)(C).

252

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 684.

253

See id, 490 S.E.2d at 684. The non-economic damages were awarded for "emotional distress,
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notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur. 2 Upon denial of their 2post
55
trial motions, Sheetz appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Sheetz argued that under the standards enumerated in BMW,
the punitive award was grossly excessive, and thus violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Sheetz further contended that the Circuit Court
failed to engage in a meaningful and adequate review of the punitive damage award
as mandated by Games. 7
B. The Majority Per Curiam Opinion
25 8
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion,
concluded that the punitive damages awarded in connection with the theories of
unlawful termination and refusal to allow Ms. Vandevender to apply for rehire or
return to work were excessive under its prior holdings. 25 9 However, the Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the punitive damages awarded in connection with the theory of retaliation.280

1. Discussion of Applicable Law
The Supreme Court began their analysis with a discussion of federal law
regarding punitive damages. 261 The Court reaffirmed that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits imposition of a "grossly excessive" punishment on a tortfeasor.28 2 The Court recognized the three "guideposts" of BMW, and
the special procedural concern for adequate notice of the severity of the penalty
imposed by the award. 8 3
The Supreme Court next discussed the recent developments in West Virginia law concerning punitive damages. 2 4 The Court outlined the West Virginia
upset, embarrassment, and humiliation." Id. at n.12.
See id. The circuit court granted Sheetz' motion for remittitur with regard to $6,200 of the 13,200
the jury awarded for medical expenses because the evidence presented could not justify such an award. See
id. at n.13.
See id.
255

254

256

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 684.

257

See id.

See Lieving v. Hadley, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (W. Va. 1992) (noting that a per curiam opinion is
not mandatory precedent beyond the syllabus points).
See id. at 683.
259
258

260

See id.

261

See id.at 684.

262

Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 684 (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 562 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 454)).

263

See id. at 684-85.

264

See id. at 685.
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system for awarding and reviewing punitive damages, noting that proper review
was lacking prior to the Games decision.265
Following a statement of the Games requirements, the Court noted the important distinction made in TXO between defendants who did not intentionally or
malevolently harm a plaintiff and those defendants who intentionally and knowingly committed harmful acts. 26 The Court concluded its discussion of applicable
law with its recent decision in Alkire, where the West Virginia punitive damage
jurisprudence was announced as a two-step paradigm. 267 This two-step paradigm
begins by determining whether the defendant's acts justify imposition of punitive
damages, and then if an award is warranted, a review
268 is mandated using the established standards to decide if the award is excessive.
The Court refused to consider Sheetz' argument that punitive damages are
not recoverable for violations of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Worker's
Compensation Act or the Human Rights Act because Sheetz failed to raise this
substantive objection in the lower court.269 In refusing to address these issues for
the first time on appeal, the Court remarked that they "will not pass on a nonjurisdictional270question which has not been decided by the trial court in the first instance.

The West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act does not address the relief
available for discrimination claims, 271 but the West Virginia Human Rights Act
provides that the remedy "may include but is not limited to, . . . any other legal or

equitable relief, as the court deems appropriate. 272 The Supreme Court of Appeals
recently announced that this statutory provision authorizes punitive damages
27 3
awards as "equitable relief' under the West Virginia Human Rights Act.

265

See id. Under the West Virginia system for an award and review of punitive awards, there must

be. (1) a reasonable constraint on jury discretion; (2) a meaningful and adequate review by the trial court
using well-established principles; and (3) a meaningful and adequate appellate review. See Games, 413
S.E.2d at 908.
266

See id. at 686.

267

See id. at 687.

268

See id. In the Alkire case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first engaged in a review

of the entire record to determine if the defendant's conduct could be categorized as the type giving rise to
imposition of punitive damages. See Alkire, 475 S.E.2d at 129. The Alkire Court found that the trial court
was incorrect in determining that no reasonable jury could have reached a verdict finding punitive damages.
See id. The Alkire Court found instead that the evidence of the defendant's misconduct was such that a reasonable trier of fact could have easily reached a decision returning a punitive award in favor of Mr. Alkire.
overturning the trial court's decision. See id.
269

See id.

270

Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 687 (quoting Sands v. Security Trust Co.. 102 S.E.2d 733, Syl. Pt. 2

(1958)).
271

See id. at 695 (Maynard, J., dissenting).

272

W.VA. CODE § 5-11-13(c) (Supp. 1998).

273

Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc. Inc., 521 S.E.2d 331, Syl. Pt. 5 (W. Va. 1999).
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2. Application of West Virginia Punitive Damages Law
After enumerating the standards to be used in deciding this case, the Supreme Court of Appeals began their application of West Virginia punitive damage
law to the facts of Ms. Vandevender's case.
a. Conduct Authorizing Assessment of Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court of Appeals first addressed the threshold question of
whether Sheetz' conduct justified assessment of punitive damages.27 4 The standard
of proof in West Virginia for finding conduct allowing imposition of punitive damages is a preponderance of the evidence.275 Conduct necessary to recover punitive
damages in West Virginia includes: (1) gross fraud; (2) malice; (3) oppression; (4)
wanton, willful, or reckless conduct; (5) criminal indifference to civil rights of others; and (6) acts legislatively authorized as deserving of punitive damages.
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that Sheetz' .conduct entitled Ms.
Vandevender to a punitive award. 7 The Court specifically pointed to Sheetz' admissions of violating state law and public policy by preventing Ms. Vandevender
from returning to her job, and failing to accommodate her physical limitations. 278
The Court also cited as evidence of improper conduct Sheetz' failure to pay any of
Ms. Vandevender's hospital bills despite its stipulation to $7,000 in medical expenses, and Sheetz' failure to engage in settlement negotiations.27 9 Furthermore, the
evidence of surveillance efforts by Sheetz and the regional manager's feigned igno280
rance of Ms. Vandevender's physical limitations were cited as improper conduct.
The Vandevender Court approved of the trial court's finding of conduct

274

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 688.

275

See Beasley, supra note 42, at 2213.

276

See Mayer, 22 S.E. 58, Syl. PL4.

277

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 688.

278

See id. Sheetz' company policy preventing injured employees from working until they are

"100%" violated the Workers' Compensation Act which states, in part, that:
It shall be a discriminatory practice within the meaning of section one of this article
[W.VA. CODE § 23-SA-I] for an employer to fail to reinstate an employee who has sustained a compensable injury to the employee's former position of employment upon
demand for such reinstatement provided that the position is available and the employee
is not disabled from performing the duties of such position.

§ 23-5A-3(b).
See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 688. Ms. Vandevender had offered to settle for her reinstatement

W.VA. CODE
279

plus $30,000, but Sheetz refused to settle the case. See id.
at n.21.
Id. at 688. The evidence showed that the regional manager returned to the store to retrieve the

280

tape that was made of Ms. Vandevender the day before. The evidence also showed that pictures taken by
various sales clerks of Ms. Vandevender as she shopped at Sheetz' store found their way to the district manager's office at Sheetz' corporate headquarters. Id. The trial court observed that no one took responsibility at
trial for this surveillance. Id.
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sufficient to support the assessment of punitive damages. Specifically, the Court
held that "[g]iven Sheetz' admissions of discriminatory acts that constitute violations of both state law and public policy, 281 we conclude that sufficient evidence
was presented of willful, wanton, and/or reckless conduct that warranted a consideration of punitive damages by the jury. '282
b. Meaningful and Adequate Review
Next, the Court considered the question of whether the trial court properly
conducted a meaningful and adequate review within the established guidelines for
punitive awards.283 The Court found that the trial court had considered all of the
required factors enumerated in Garnes28 4 and therefore had engaged in an appropriate review of the punitive award.285
The Vandevender Court held that the trial court had acted consistent with
the procedural dictates from Games.286 The Court rejected Sheetz' contention that
it was denied a meaningful and adequate review of the punitive damages award.287
To the contrary, the record showed that the trial court had explicitly laid out its
reasons for finding conduct deserving of punitive damages, and for finding that the
award was not excessive.2 88
c. Excessiveness of the Punitive Damages Award
Finally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals examined whether
the punitive damage award was excessive. 28 9 Before analyzing the size of the
award, the Court criticized Sheetz for stating its assignments of error rather conclusorily, rather than with particularity as mandated in syllabus point five of Gar-

281

Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 689 n.22. Sheetz admitted that its personnel erroneously enforced

two company policies in violation of West Virginia law: an unwritten policy that required all workers to be
100% before coming back to work and a written policy of firing employees who were absent for more than
one year. Id.
282

Id. at 688-89.

283

See id. at 689.

In Games, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered whether its guidelines provided sufficient review of punitive damage awards by trial courts. See Games, 413 S.E.2d at 908. In light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Haslip,the Games Court found that the trial court's review of
the punitive damage award was neither meaningful nor adequate as required by the Due Process Clause. See
id. Consequently, the Court adopted the Alabama procedures approved by the Supreme Court in Haslip. See
id
284

285

See id.

286

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 689.

287

See id.

288

See id.

289

See id. at 689-90.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol101/iss3/6

34

Hicks: Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc.: A Closer Look at the Framework for R

1999]

VANDEVENDER v. SHEETZ, INC.

nes.29° After applying the relevant standards dictated by syllabus points three and
four of Games and syllabus point fifteen of TXO, the Court held that the punitive
damages awarded for the unlawful termination and failure to rehire claims were
excessive. 29' However, the Court did not reduce the amount of punitive damages
awarded for the retaliation claim.
The Court viewed separately, as did the jury, the damages awarded for the
unlawful termination and failure to rehire from the retaliatory damages. 292 The jury
awarded $221,748 in compensatory damages and $1,575,000 in punitive damages
for the unlawful termination and failure to rehire claims.293 These figures represented a seven-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.294 For the retaliation claim, the jury awarded, after remittitur, $72,118 in compensatory damages
and $1,124,000 in punitive damages, a fifteen-to-one ratio.295
The Court recognized the necessity for vigilance against punitive awards
that are unreasonable in light of their purpose to punish and deter, and as a result,
violate due process. 29 The Court then began its application of the Games factors to
determine if the award was reasonable and thus within the due process limitations
intended to guard
against penalties which are grossly excessive in relation to the
297
state's interest.
The first of the Games factors requires that punitive awards bear a reasonable relationship to the potential and actual harm caused by the defendant's actions. 298 The Court recognized that "[i]nherent to this inquiry is the notion that the
amount of the damages awarded are directly connected to the nature of the defendant's conduct-the more egregious the conduct of the defendant, the greater the
award." 299 "This principle reflects the accepted view that some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others. ' 3 °°
The Court then applied the standard from syllabus point fifteen of TXO
which distinguishes between conduct that demonstrates extreme negligence and

290

See id. at 690. Syllabus point five of Garnes requires a petitioner to address the factors set forth in

syllabus points three and four with particularity and to summarize the facts given to the jury on the subject or
to the trial court at the post-judgment review stage. See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Games,
413 S.E.2d at 900).
291

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 693-94.

292

See id.
at 690.

293

See id.

294

See id.

295

See id.

296

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21).

297

See id. at 690.

298

See id. at 691 (quoting Games, 413 S.E.2d at 658 Syl. Pt.3).

299

Id. at 691.

300

BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
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conduct that evinces a real intent to cause harm."' The significance of this distinction is that West Virginia punitive damage law places an outer limit of five-to-one
regarding the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in cases where no actual
intent to harm is evidenced. 0 2 Only when the defendant can be shown to have intended to cause harm can the ratio be permitted to climb higher without "rais[ing] a
suspicious judicial eyebrow. 3 03
The Court reasoned that the type of evidence shown in connection with the
unlawful termination and failure to rehire claims suggested an employer acting
against state law and policies, but not an employer whose conduct showed a malicious intent to prevent Ms. Vandevender from returning to her job.30 4 This evidence
included Sheetz' admissions that its employment policies
were in violation of the
305
Workers' Compensation Act and the Human Rights Act.
On the other hand, the Court held that the evidence presented against
Sheetz with regard to the retaliation theory suggested a mean-spirited intent to punish Ms. Vandevender for her injury and her subsequent claims against Sheetz. 306 As
evidence of an intent to cause harm, the Court noted the conduct of the regional
manager who willfully pretended to be unaware of Ms. Vandevender's work restrictions, ordered her to obtain a new medical examination and directed her to
perform strenuous physical work that very day.30 7 The Court also pointed to Sheetz'
surveillance of Ms. Vandevender during both when she returned to work and when
she shopped at the store as evidence of malicious intent.308
The Court further stated that the deceptiveness employed by the regional
manager when she feigned ignorance of Ms. Vandevender's medical restrictions
and Sheetz' continued use of surveillance cameras on Ms. Vandevender was comparable to the "fraud, trickery, or deceit" recognized by the United States Supreme
Court in TXO as deserving of larger punitive awards. 30 9 In TXO, the Supreme Court
noted the dramatic disparity between the actual damages and the punitive award,
but upheld the punitive damage award in light of the potential harm of the defendant's conduct, the bad faith of the defendant, the fact that the scheme employed
was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and the defendant's

301

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 691.

302

See td.

303

Id. (quoting 7X0, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).

304

See id.

305

See id. at n.29. Sheetz claimed to have been unaware of the West Virginia laws that it admitted

violating. See id.
306

See Vandevender. 490 S.E.2d at 691.

307

See id.

308

See id.

309

Id.at 693.
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wealth. 1 0
The next Games factor the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered was the degree of reprehensibility of Sheetz' conduct. 31" The United States
Supreme Court in BMW, stated that the degree of reprehensibility may be the most
important indicator of the reasonableness of a punitive award 3 12 The West Virginia
Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the record of reprehensible conduct by
Sheetz.1 3 The punitive award was supported by evidence of Sheetz' failure to reasonably accommodate Ms. Vandevender, failure to allow her to return to work absent full recovery, termination of her, refusal to rehire her, and failure to admit its
knowledge of her work limitations.314 The award was also supported by Sheetz'
program which rewarded managers with bonuses tied to reduced worker's compensation premiums. 1 5 Sheetz' conduct regarding the retaliation claim may have
evinced reckless disregard or indifference to Ms. Vandevender's health and safety.
Furthermore, Sheetz' conduct in connection with the unlawful termination and
failure to rehire claims show that Sheetz' employment policies were in violation of
West Virginia law. 16
The Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that there were no comparable civil or criminal penalties available for the conduct at issue.317 No criminal
penalties exist for violation of the Human Rights Act. 31 8 The Workers' Compensation Act does provide for a civil cause of action based on violation of its antidiscrimination provisions.31 9 However, that enabling section does not set a penalty
limit, and therefore, the Court concluded that it was without any useful civil or
criminal penalties for purposes of comparison. 20
These Garnes factors were used to determine if Sheetz received adequate
notice of the conduct which would subject them to penalty and of the size of the
punishment that might be assessed. The Court particularly wished to address
Sheetz' argument that the BMW decision altered the review factors previously iden310

TXO, 509 U.S. at 462.

311

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 691.

312

BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.

31;

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 691-92.

314

See Id.

315

See Id

In BMY, the United States Supreme Court did not consider BMW's conduct to be reprehensible.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 576. The Supreme Court found that BMW was actually in compliance with the strictest
316

state statutes dealing with that issue, and therefore BMW was acting in good faith on a policy that had never
been deemed unlawful. See id. at 577-80. Moreover, BMW's conduct showed no indifference to or reckless

disregard for the health and safety of others. See id. at 576.
317

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 692.

318

See id.

319

See id. (citing W.VA.

320

See id. at 692.

CODE § 23-5A-2).
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tified in Games.321 The Court maintained that BMW's "guideposts" are merely
reiterations of factors previously used by both this Court and the United States Supreme Court. 322 The Court further remarked that, contrary to Sheetz' contention
that BMW altered West Virginia law on punitive damages review, each one of the
BMW "guideposts" was in fact applied by the trial court in its punitive award review.323 Moreover, the Court stated that there was nothing in the BMW case that
excluded previously considered factors that are not among the big three "guideposts. '324 Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no merit to Sheetz' argument that BMW demanded that punitive awards be reviewed differently than the
system as it existed under Games.325
As a result of these findings and the application of syllabus point fifteen of
TXO, the Court found the seven-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
in connection with the unlawful termination and failure to rehire claims was excessive.326 Consequently, the Court reduced the punitive damages awarded for those
two claims by $466,260 so that the punitive to compensatory ratio would be
roughly five-to-one.327
However, since the Court found that the evidence supporting the retaliation
claim showed elements of fraud, trickery and deceit, and an actual intent to cause
Ms. Vandevender physical or emotional harm, the punitive award for that claim
was upheld. 328 The Court stated that they were properly satisfied that the trial court
engaged in the review required and that the facts of this case regarding the retaliation claim supported upholding the fifteen-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages and did not offend due process. 9
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Maynard dissented, opining that punitive damages are not recoverable for violation of either the Human Rights Act or Workers' Compensation
Act. 330 Justice Maynard stated that "it is clear that these acts do not specifically
authorize punitive damage awards and our case law indicates that punitive damages

321

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at 692.

322

See id.

323

See id.

324

See id.

325

See id.

326

See Vandevender,490 S.E.2d at 693.

327

See id.

328

See Id.

329

See id. at 693-94.

See id. at 694 (Maynard. J., dissenting). Sheetz did not preserve this issue for appeal because this
objection was not raised at the trial court level. See Vandevender. 490 S.E.2d at 687.
330
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are not an element of damages under the Human Rights Act.. . .,331 He reasoned
that "[a]lthough the Workers' Compensation Act does not address the relief available for workers' compensation discrimination, I believe that it would not differ
from the relief available under the Human Rights Act., 332 Based upon dicta in previous cases,3 3 and the lack of clear legislation stating that punitive damages are
recoverable, Justice Maynard argued that punitive damages were not recoverable in
the Vandevender case.'%
Justice Maynard acknowledged that the West Virginia case of Dobson v.
Eastern Associated Coal Corp., held that "other legal and equitable relief' means
that a plaintiff may generally recover damages available in tort.3" If "other legal or
equitable relief," as provided in the Human Rights Act, also means that a plaintiff in a Human Rights Act case may generally recover damages available in tort,
then these recoverable damages would likely include punitive damages. However,
Justice Maynard recognized dicta from Harmon stating that "punitive damages...
are not an element of damages under the Human Rights Act., 337 While it is indeed
clear that these acts do not specifically authorize punitive damage awards, the statutes do not specifically prohibit punitive damages either. The express language
from the Human Rights Act which provides for "any other legal or equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate," hardly appears to be limiting the damages recoverable.
Justice Maynard acknowledged that Ms. Vandevender had clearly been
treated badly by Sheetz. However, he argued that 'while nearly $300,000 in compensatory and noneconomic damages seemed fair, $2.2 million was simply 'too
much under the facts of this case. 38 Justice Maynard summarized the struggle to
find the correct balance in punitive damage jurisprudence by stating that "[t]he task
of determining what constitutes an excessive punitive damages award, in light of
due process guarantees, is extremely difficult, and not given to bright line rules. 339
Justice Maynard concluded his dissent by invoking the memory of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart,340 commenting that "I know an excessive puni-
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it." Jacobellisv. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)(Stewart, J., concurring).
340

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1999

39

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 101, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6
[Vol. 101:523

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

tive damages award when I see one, and I see one here."

1

V. CONCLUSION

The Vandevender v. Sheetz decision demonstrates the inherent difficulties
in attempting to set meaningful standards on the case-specific doctrine of punitive
damages. Over the last decade, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
set and adhered to the constitutionally acceptable standards handed down by a Supreme Court that fully understands the problems of trying to objectively guide the
lower courts through a subjective reasoning process.
The Supreme Court has recently accomplished much in their attempts to
ensure due process protections to those on the unfriendly end of a punitive award.
The four Supreme Court cases of Haslip, TXO, Oberg, and BM-W have set and
modified due process standards to find a framework of analysis that courts can
follow when determining whether an award is reasonable or excessive.
The BMW case in particular has given meaning to the standard of "reasonableness" by engaging ina delicate balance between the competing interests involved in the awarding of punitive damages. The three factors that BMWf set out as
"guideposts" help ensure that a tortfeasor has adequate notice of the size of a punitive award assessed against him. The wrongdoer can expect that the penalty will
correspond to the reprehensibility of their bad conduct. The three factors help provide restraint against arbitrary decisions motivated by passion or prejudice by comparing the punitive award with civil or criminal penalties as well as with the actual
harm inflicted by the tortfeasor. As a result, lower courts are able to conduct a more
objective review of jury awards. The BMW, decision has finally managed to provide
some limit to punitive awards, but not such constraint as to turn the doctrine into
just another tax on businesses. The BMW guideposts have also provided a degree of
substantive due process analysis rather than only a strict procedural due process
framework.
The controversy surrounding the availability of punitive damage recovery
under the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act or the Human Rights Act was
no doubt heightened by the Vandevender decision. However, Vandevender did not
break new ground in employment law. No guidance was offered from the decision,
as the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.342 Justice Maynard's dissent is
irrelevant to the majority per curiam opinion because the issue was not addressed
by the Vandevender Court. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has sub43
sequently held that punitive damages are available under the Human Rights Act.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has kept up with the recent
developments from the United States Supreme Court and has attempted to ensure
fair procedures through its decisions in Games, TXO, and Alkire. These decisions
have adopted sound procedural guidelines for the review of punitive damage
341
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awards. The Court has solidified West Virginia's position regarding syllabus point
fifteen of TXO, which places a five-to-one punitive to compensatory ratio limit on
claims lacking evidence of malice, intent to harm, fraud, trickery or deceit.
The process of review utilized in Vandevender is the same framework used
by the Court in Alkire. Indeed, if a per curiam opinion is to be followed as mandatory precedent only with regards to the syllabus points, " then Vandevender and
Alkire are the exact same case. The Vandevender decision, right or wrong, shows
West Virginia's commitment to a stable process for reviewing punitive awards.
William B. Hicks

See Vandevender, 490 S.E.2d at691.
See Lieving, 423 S.E.2d at 604 nA.
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